Sentencing Councils: A Study of
Sentence Disparity and its Reduction*
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The fundamental premise in the idea of impartialjudges and
rules of law is that certain kinds of decision-making, for example, by
judges, can by institutionalarrangementsand role discipline be made
to show less variance and less correlation to personal factors than
other kinds of decision-making. .

.

. Beyond this there is the ques-

tion of whether different arrangementswill produce different degrees
of impersonality in decision-making.'
HARRY KALVEN, JR.

The severity of a criminal sentence depends to some extent on
the identity of the sentencing judge. Comparable cases will not
always receive comparable sentences. Although all would acknowledge that such sentence disparity among judges exists, there is disagreement both about the magnitude of the disparity and how it
might be reduced.
One institutional arrangement used in some federal courts to
alleviate sentence disparity is the sentencing council. The council
enables the sentencing judge, before imposing sentence, to meet
with his colleagues in order to learn what sentences they would
impose if they were the sentencing judge. This article first reviews
the problems sentence disparity has created and recounts earlier
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efforts to study the phenomenon. It then develops a measure of
disparity that might prove useful in future research and uses it to
assess the magnitude of sentence disparity in two federal district
courts: the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) and the Eastern
District of New York (Brooklyn). Finally it describes the operation
of the sentencing councils in these two courts and tries to assess
their ability to reduce disparity.
I.

THE PROBLEM

Under any system of law, unless there is but one mandatory
penalty, the sentence of an offender will depend partly on the identity of the sentencing judge. Under American law, the trial judge's
views and values can play a particularly important role. The law
provides practically no guidelines regarding the weights to be given
to the many aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime,
the offender, and the victim. Unlike his colleagues outside the
Anglo-American tradition, the American judge need not and generally does not give reasons for his sentencing decision. Since the
legal sentencing frames are normally broad, especially for the more
serious crimes, similar offenders who commit similar offenses under
similar circumstances may receive substantially different sentences.
Moreover, because American law does not allow an independent
appeal of the sentence, 2 the trial judge's sentence is generally final,
3
subject to adjustment only by parole or executive pardon.
Sentence disparity is a matter of concern to the offender, the
judge, and the criminal justice system as a whole. The person most
directly affected is the offender. As James V. Bennett, a former
director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, observed:
The prisoner who must serve his excessively long sentence with
other prisoners who receive relatively mild sentences under the
same circumstances cannot be expected to accept his situation
with equanimity. The more fortunate prisoners do not attribute
their luck to a sense of fairness on the part of the law but to
its whimsies. The existence of such disparities is among the
2 The

propriety of the sentence may be indirectly called into question on appeal in

certain circumstances. See generally M.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOuT ORDER

(1973).
1 But see ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, §§ 2141-44 (1965), which requires state judges to
give reasons for their sentences. And ten states permit some sentencing appeal. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.120, 22.10.020 (1970); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1717 (1956); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-509 (1971). See also S.B. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (would allow separate
appeal of a sentence).
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major causes of prison riots,' and it is one of the reasons why
prisons so often fail to bring about an improvement in the
social attitudes of their charges.4
Judges, too, are disturbed by these variations. At the urging of the
federal judiciary, the Congress, in 1958, passed a law providing for
sentencing institutes where federal judges could exchange information on sentencing alternatives and practices with the aim of reducing undesirable sentence disparity. 5 More recently, Judge Marvin E.
Frankel discussed the problem in his landmark book, Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order:'
[I]n the great majority of federal criminal cases . . . a defendant who comes up for sentencing has no way of knowing or
reliably predicting whether he will walk out of the courtroom
on probation, or be locked up for a term of years that may
consume the rest of his life, or something in between.
The costs of disparity to the system are high. As Mr. Justice
Jackson said when he was Attorney General of the United States:
It is obviously repugnant to one's sense of justice that the judgment meted out to an offender should depend in large part on
a purely fortuitous circumstance; namely the personality of the
particular judge before whom the case happens to come for
7
disposition .
For all concerned, sentence disparity offends a shared concept of
fairness.

I.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF DISPARITY

In order to measure sentence disparity caused by differences
among judges, all other factors that may affect the sentence must
be controlled. This goal has been approached in three ways.
A.

Random Assignment

If a court assigns cases at random to its judges, they will receive
comparable groups of cases." Differences in sentences must then be
J. BENNETT, OF PRISONS AND JUSTICE, S. Doc. No. 70, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 319 (1964).
H.R. REP. No. 1916, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
'M. FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 6. See also JUSTICE INSENTENCING: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENTENCING INSTITUTE FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES JUDICIL Cmcurrs

(L. Orland & H. Tyler, Jr. eds. 1974); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 133-41 (1969) (considers the problem in a wider context).
7 1940 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 5-6.
Within the limits of the sampling error.
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due to differences among the judges; such random assignment creates a natural controlled experiment. The earliest studies of sentence disparity relied on this design, but were not alert to its operational limitations.
The first of these was Everson's study in 1919, which compared
the sentencing patterns of forty-two magistrates in New York City.9
He found that after conviction for public intoxication the frequency
of suspended sentences varied from less than 1 percent to 83 percent
among the magistrates; moreover, the frequency of suspended sentences tended to reflect the magistrate's ethnic background. In 1933
Gaudet et al. published their first finding from a study of 7,442
sentences imposed by six county judges of a New Jersey court that
claimed to distribute its cases randomly."0 The most lenient judge
ordered incarceration in 34 percent of his cases, the most severe
judge for 58 percent of the offenders he sentenced. The sentencing
patterns showed no change over time for three of the judges, while
two became more severe and one more lenient. In 1938 Gaudet
published disparity figures by type of crime. 1
These studies have limitations. Random assignment will produce initially comparable groups only if correctly applied across a
large number of cases. In practice, considerations of court management or simple carelessness may interfere with the operation of the
random assignment rule. 2 Moreover, even if assignment is random,
cases are usually assigned before they reach the sentencing stage.
Although sensible for the court, by the time the randomly assigned
cases reach the sentencing stage, their mix is likely to differ from
judge to judge. Differential rates of guilty pleas and convictions
after trial, factors that are themselves partly functions of personality differences among the judges, will then affect the mix of cases
and, in turn, the sentences.
B.

Selecting Comparable Groups of Cases
Without prior random assignment, comparability might be

Everson, The Human Element in Justice, J. CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1919).
GAUDET, HARRIS & JOHN, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of
Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933).
" Gaudet, Individual Differences in the Sentencing of Judges, 32 ARCH. OF PSYCHOLOGY
1 (1938).
"0

12 In the federal courts, a judge will occasionally be bypassed if he is already burdened
with cases requiring an unusual amount of trial time. The random assignment rule is also
distorted when a new judge comes to the court and receives his first cases by transfer from
his colleagues; if he came from the U.S. Attorney's Office, he will not be assigned criminal
cases prepared during his time at the Office.
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sought in the following manner: first, the cases of each judge are
divided into subgroups according to characteristic factors likely to
affect the sentence, such as the crime, the defendant, and the victim; second, comparisons are drawn among judges for cases within
each subgroup. As the subgroups become more specific, they will
approach comparability. The analyst can never be certain, however,
that the groups are perfectly comparable because he cannot rule out
the possibility that some unknown variable affecting the sentences
is more heavily represented in the cases of one judge than in those
3
of another.
One of the more elaborate examples of this approach to the
study of sentence disparity is Green's investigation of the Philadelphia criminal court during the late 1950s.14 Based on the 1,437 convictions obtained during a seventeen-month period in 1956-57, he
analyzed the sentencing patterns of the eighteen judges in cases
where the severity of the crime, the offender's criminal record, and
other important factors were held constant. Green's data arrangement was appropriate, but his conclusions were not. In contrast to
earlier disparity studies, he claimed to have found only minimal
sentence disparity. But Green misread his data, which clearly show
sentence disparity, especially in the middle ranges of severity. 5
The ready availability of precise statistics for all United States
federal court cases has generated several studies of sentence disparity within the federal system. One of the first comparisons of
this kind was presented to the Pilot Institute of Sentencing, held in
Boulder, Colorado, in the summer of 1959. One participant reported:' 6
The most shocking exhibit. . . was a chart showing the disparity of sentences in income tax cases over a period of 12 years.
In one district all of the defendants who were convicted or
pleaded guilty were sent to prison. The percentage of those sent
to prison in other districts varied widely, from under 5 percent
to over 90 percent.
The magnitude of the differences in the sentencing patterns of varCf. D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL
(1966); F. CHAPIN, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
ZEISEL, SAY IT wrrH FIGURES (5th ed. 1968).
IS

RESEARCH

AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR
IN SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

(1955); H.

11E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING (1961) (Cambridge Studies in CriminolSee also R. HOOD, SENTENCING IN MAGISTRATES' COURTS, A STUDY IN VARIATIONS OF POLICY
123 (1962); Zeisel, Methodological Problems in Studies of Sentencing, 3 LAW & Soc'Y 621-33
(1969).
ogy).

Id. at 134-38.
, Thomsen, Sentencing in Income Tax Cases, 26 FED. PROBATION, March 1962, at 10.
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ious districts is so great that it is reasonable to infer that the judges'
differing sentencing philosophies are a primary cause of the disparity; this inference assumes that the mix of cases in the different
districts does not vary enough to account for the observed sentence
disparities. In order to test this assumption, it would be necessary
to break down the mix of cases into comparable subgroups as described above. Rau has made a trial step in this direction by analyzing sentences for ten major crime categories controlling for the offender's prior record.1 7 He found significant disparities among the
circuits. Additional disparities might have emerged had he looked
at districts within each circuit.
A study now in progress by Tiffany, Avichai, and Peters, sponsored by the American Bar Foundation, promises to carry this type
of analysis several steps further. They have collected detailed data
on all offenders convicted in the federal system during a two year
period, the crimes of which they had been convicted, and their type
of plea. The authors will be able to analyze the sentencing patterns
in the various districts by comparing those cases that share particular combinations of characteristics likely to affect the sentence.' 8 It
would be useful to push the analysis still further and compile comparative data on individual judges in order to see the interplay
among judges, districts, and circuits.'"
While these refinements promise more specific disparity measures, the approach has natural limits. There are only a certain
number of convictions in the system, and every refinement step2
makes each subgroup smaller and each comparison less reliable. 1
The sample of cases, moreover, cannot be safely expanded by including cases from more years, because sentencing patterns may
change over time as judges retire and are replaced.
C. Identical Cases
A third approach to the study of sentence disparity requires
different judges to "sentence" an identical group of cases, thereby
ensuring absolute comparability. Because criminal sentences in
'1 Rau, Sentencing in the Federal District Courts (1972) (mimeographed paper prepared
for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (LEAA)).
Is They have published a partial analysis of their data but have not yet made comparisons by districts. See Tiffany, Avichai & Peters, A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in
Federal Courts: Defendants ConvictedAfter Trial, 1967-1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIES 369 (1975).
11 One might extend the comparison to the state courts in the federal districts to learn
whether sentencing standards in the two systems affect each other.
Beyond a certain level of refinement, some subgroups will lose all their cases and thus
lose their comparative -value.
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American courts are always imposed by a single trial judge, this
approach must to some extent rely on simulated sentencing decisions, whereby each judge states the sentence he would give if he
2
were the sentencing judge. '
The first such attempt was made in 1961 by federal judges at2
the Sentencing Institutes held by the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans
and by the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits in Highland Park,
Illinois.2 The sentences handed down in the sample cases by the
conference judges varied widely. In one case of income tax evasion,
for example, the recommended sentences ranged from a six-month
suspended prison sentence to a five-year prison sentence with a
$20,000 fine.Y In an embezzlement case the sentences ranged be25
tween probation and five years custody.
The Federal Judicial Center recently conducted a systematic
study of disparity using simulated sentencing. 26 Second Circuit
judges read presentence reports and made sentence recommendations in thirty cases. Substantial disparities were found; in sixteen
of the twenty cases submitted to all of the judges, there was
disagreement in regard to the propriety of incarceration.
In England, Rupert Cross, throughout his career concerned
with the problems of sentencing, has made informal experiments
with sentencing. One of them was designed to show that judges too
are human. The case involved manslaughter through grossly negligent driving. Some of the judges received the case ornamented by a
legally irrelevant variable: the negligent driver was accompanied by
a married woman, not his wife. Throughout, the man with the
27
woman received a more severe sentence.
21 In many countries, especially on the European continent, sentences for major crimes
are determined by a tribunal of several judges. Such a system would permit disparity to be
measured without simulation. But this seemingly perfect "naturally controlled experiment"
suffers from a potential difficulty: the unavoidable bargaining process may move some judges
to make their initial recommendation artificially high or low for negotiating purposes.
2 Sentencing Institute and Joint Council for the Fifth Circuit, New Orleans, 1961, 30
F.R.D. 185 (1962) [hereinafter cited as New Orleans Conference].
2 Seminar and Institute on Disparityof Sentences for Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Judicial Circuits, Highland Park, Illinois, 1961, 30 F.R.D. 401 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Highland Park Conference].
24 New Orleans Conference at 226.
U Highland Park Conference at 500.
24 A. Partridge & W. Eldridge, The Second Circuit Sentencing Study, Federal Judicial
Center (August 1974).
21 From a personal communication to Hans Zeisel. Cross thus anticipated a favorite
experimental pastime of present-day psychologists. Cf. Landy & Aronson, The Influence of
the Characterof the Criminal and Victim on the Decisionsof Simulated Jurors, 5 J. ExPERIMENTAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 141-52 (1969); Sigall & Ostrove, Beautiful But Dangerous:
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Roger Hood, who earlier had studied sentence disparity in the
English magistrate courts by the "comparable cases" method, studied sentence disparity by submitting identical cases of serious driving offenses to a panel of judges. To make the simulation more
realistic, he included excerpts from the trial record, highlighted the
testimony, and gave a careful description of the offender. 8
Despite such precautions, simulated sentencing recommendations may differ from real sentencing decisions. To impose a long
prison term is a difficult task even after years on the bench; a
simulated sentence sends no one to jail. Moreover, simulated sentencing is based on a written record which, however carefully prepared, cannot substitute for information gained from a sentencing
judge's presence in court. It is reasonable to suppose that a less
complete picture of the case leaves more to the judge's imagination
and increases the likelihood of disagreements over the sentence." In
addition, the judge may suspect that the experiment is designed to
measure his "severity" and, if only unconsciously, may seek to dispel an unwanted reputation by deviating from his normal sentencing practice.
The many cautionary notes we have added to the description
of these earlier studies must not lead to a general distrust of them.
As studies of the same problem using various research approaches
proliferate, the valid ones, whatever their individual imperfections,
tend to support each other by mutual corroboration."
The "identical case" approach offers the best opportunity for
measuring disparity, and the sentencing council provides the optimal arrangement of this approach. While elements of simulation
remain, the participating judges know that their recommendations
can and often do have a real impact on the sentence actually imposed. Under present law no more realistic arrangement can be
devised that will allow several judges to sentence one offender.
IlI.

THE SENTENCING COUNCIL

The first sentencing council was started in the Eastern District
of Michigan in 1960,1 followed by the Eastern District of New York
Effects of Offender Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 410-14 (1975).
21 R. HOOD, SENTENCING THE MOTORING OFFENDER (1972).
n This is probably a special case of a more general proposition, applicable to all experiments which use abbreviated materials, such as abstracted trial scripts in jury experiments.
11See generally H. ZEISEL, supra note 10, at 200-39 (ch. 13, Triangulation of Proof).
31See Doyle, A Sentencing Council in Operation, 25 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1961, at 27;
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in 1962,31 the Northern District of Illinois in 19 63 , 3 and, more recently, the District of Oregon. All four councils are still in operation.
Data from the New York 34 and Chicago 5 courts form the basis of this
study.
The New York and Chicago courts generally hold weekly meetings of the sentencing council. Several days before the meeting, each
participating judge receives a copy of the presentence report prepared by the court's probation office for each offender. The report
contains a short description of the offense and the background of the
offender. The judges then record their sentence recommendations.
The cases and recommendations are discussed at the next council
meeting. After hearing the discussion and the sentences recommended by his colleagues, the sentencing judge makes his final
decision. The council is purely advisory; the sentencing judge retains complete discretion in making the final decision.
The Chicago and New York councils differ in important respects. In New York, every case is considered by panels of three
Hosner, Group Procedurein Sentencing: A Decadeof Practice,34 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1970,
at 18; Kaufman, Sentencing: The Judge's Problem, 24 FED. PROBATION, March 1960, at 3;
Levin, Toward a More EnlightenedSentencing Procedure,43 NEB. L. REv. 499 (1966); Smith,
The Sentencing Council and the Problem of DisproportionateSentences, 27 FED. PROBATION,
June 1963, at 5; cf. Sigurdson, The Federal Sentencing Council: An Attempt at Disparity
Reduction, 1964 (summary of unpublished master's thesis, U. of Michigan School of Social
Work).
32Zavatt, Sentencing Procedure in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, 41 F.R.D. 469 (1966).
3 B. Meeker, Values of a Sentencing Council, Oct. 1964 (paper presented at the Institute
and Joint Council on Sentencing, Lompoc, Calif.) (The University of Chicago Law Library).
31 The New York sample is composed of 624 of the cases considered by the council panels
during the calendar year 1973. The judges keep the records in their personal files. Nine judges
provided access to them, leaving three judges whose cases were not included in the sample;
one had died, another had retired, the third was a visiting judge.
Administrative Office statistics indicate that the number of offenders sentenced during
1973 was around 1,089 (Courtesy of James McCafferty, Chief of the Operations Branch of the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts). Until 1974 sentences imposed during the summer,
some 20 percent of all cases, did not come before the council. Zavatt, supra note 32. The 624
cases, representing twelve judges, constitute therefore approximately 57 percent of all cases.
Three-fourths of the cases came before the regular three.member panels; one-fourth of the
cases came before two judges. In 14 cases no record could be found of a judge's recommended
sentence.
15The Chicago sample of 1,619 cases consisted of all the cases sentenced during the
eighteen month period between January 1, 1972, and June 30, 1973. Of these, 518 were
brought before the sentencing council; 566 belonged to judges who did not participate in the
council; and 535 cases were not brought before the council by the judges who otherwise
participated in its deliberations. The sample does not include 17 cases for which indictment
was filed before 1971; it also omits 24 cases for which the identity of the sentencing judge
could not be determined.
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judges: the sentencing judge and two of his colleagues assigned more
or less in rotation. In Chicago council participation is voluntary, and
each case comes before the full council of participating judges."
This study measures the degree of existing disparity in both
courts, discusses the ability of each council to reduce disparity, and
evaluates the effects of the organizational structures of the two
councils. First, however, it will be necessary to define sentence disparity more precisely.
IV.

THE MEASUREMENT OF DISPARITY

Sentence disparity can be measured at various levels. The first
level of disparity is disagreement among judges over the type of
sentence-custody (prison) or noncustody (probation or fine). At a
second level, differences in the duration of recommended sentence
can be measured within each type. Finally, disparity may be iileasured on a scale that considers the duration as well as the type of
sentence. Table 1 gives an overview of the sentences at the disposal
of a federal judge:37
Table 1
SIX MAJOR SENTENCING FRAMES FOR FEDERAL CRIMES

Sentencing Frames
Maximum

Minimum

1

Probation

2

Probation

3

Probation

Examples of Crimes in that Frame

$1,000 fine and/or
1 year

a) Mail theft of property up to
$100 (18 U.S.C. § 1708)
(b) Embezzlement by employee of
bank-up to $100
(18 U.S.C. § 656)

a)

3 years

b)

$1,000 fine and
3 years

a) Destruction of letter boxes or
mail (18 U.S.C. § 1705)
b) Impersonating a federal officer
(18 U.S.C. § 912)

a)

$2,000 fine and
5 years
$5,000 fine and
5 years
$10,000 fine and
5 years

a) Mail theft of property over
$100 (18 U.S.C. § 1708)
b) Sale or receipt of stolen
vehicles (18 U.S.C. § 2313)
c) Selective Service violation
(50 U.S.C. § 462(a))

b)
c)

3' Originally, the sentencing council in Chicago consisted of two panels of six members
each. Eventually, one panel stopped meeting, and the members who wished to remain on the
council joined the other panel. At the time of this study, nine members of the court were
participating in council activities, though not all of them all of the time.
31 A few rare offenses carry different upper limits, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 701 (1970) (illegal
use of a government insignia); 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1970) (violation of a government park regulation); 18 U.S.C. § 114'(1970) ($1,000 and/or seven years for maiming).
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Probation

a)

$5,000 fine and/or
10 years
$10,000 fine and
10 years

a) Theft from interstate shipment
over $100 (18 U.S.C. § 659)
b) Interstate transport of stolen
goods (18 U.S.C. § 2314)

$5,000 fine and
20 years
$10,000 fine and
20 years

a) Bank robbery with force
(18 U.S.C. § 2113(a))
b) Extortion (18 U.S.C. § 894)

a)

Life imprisonment

b)

$100,000 fine and
life imprisonment

a) Murder or kidnapping during
commission of bank robbery
(18 U.S.C. § 2113(e))
b) Narcotics violation indicating
a continuing criminal enterprise
(21 U.S.C. § 848(a))

b)
5

Probation

a)
b)

6

10 years

A.

Levels of Disparity

1. Type of Sentence. A federal judge can almost always choose
between ordering imprisonment or probation. He also can mix the
two by imposing a short prison term of six months or less, followed
by a longer period of probation."8 In most cases he can also impose
a fine, and sentences for more than one count may be imposed
concurrently or consecutively.
The most crucial part of the sentencing process is the decision
whether the offender is to be imprisoned. Stability of job and family
life are at stake, even if the sentence is only a short one. This first
level of disparity, between custody and noncustody, is reflected in
Table 2.
Table 2
AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY

(AONG THREE JUDGES)

Agree to impose
no custody .......................
Agree to impose
custody ...............

..........

Total agreement
Disagree on whether
to impose custody .................

Chicago*

New York

27.8

11.4

40.8

58.9

68.6

70.3

31.4

29.7

100%

100%
(460)

(439)
*simulated for three-judge panels

38

See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:109

The two courts show almost identical figures on this first level
of disparity.39 In 30 percent and 31 percent of their respective cases,
the judges of the New York and Chicago councils disagree whether
the offender should be incarcerated. The distribution of the cases
in which they agree, however, reveals that the sentencing pattern is
more severe in the New York court. The proportion of agreed-upon
noncustody cases is 11 percent in New York; it is 28 percent in
Chicago. The custody cases show the reverse pattern.
2. Durationof Sentence. The second level of potential disparity is
disagreement over the length of the sentence, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT ON DURATION OF SENTENCE

Agree on Duration
Disagree on Duration

Percent of all Council Cases in
which there was agreement on
type of sentence (See Table 2)
*Simulated for three-judge panels

Custody Sentences

Noncustody Sentences

Chicago*

Chicago*

New York

New York

12%

10%

98%

82%

88%
100%

90%
100%

2%
100%

18%
100%

(40.8%)

(58.9%)

(27.8%)

(11.4%)

If all judges agree on custody, there will be disagreement over
its length in nine out of ten cases, both in New York and in Chicago.
If all favor probation, there will be disagreement over its length in
New York 18 percent of the time, in Chicago only 2 percent of the
time.
3. Disparityas to Type and Durationof Sentence. Measuring disparity for both type and duration of sentence requires a yardstick
that converts both dimensions to a common measure. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has developed a scale for
that purpose which we have slightly modified to provide finer detail
at the upper end of the scale and to reduce the importance of differences in length of probation (Table 4).
11Because the incidence of agreement is artificially affected by the number of participating judges, the Chicago disparity figures were computed by simulating the three-judge panels
of the New York court. This was done by randomly selecting two judges from the group of
consulting judges that participated in the particular case, and treating them as the two
advisors to the sentencing judge.
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Table 4
POINT SCALE OF SENTENCE SEVERITY

Developed by the
Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts
Fine
Probation (months)
1-12
13-36
Over 36
Split-Sentence
(Jail + Probation)
Prison (months)
1-6
7-12
13-24
25-36
37-48
49-60
61-120
over 120

As Modified

1

1

1
2
4

1
2
3*

4

4

3
5
8
10
12
14
25
50

3
5
7
9
11*
61-72 months
73-84 months

13
15
17

(Add two points for every year.)
*underlined figures are our modifications
**following the example of the Federal Judicial Center study (note 23 supra), custody
sentences under the Youth Corrections Act count as four year terms.

Even as modified, the scale fails to reveal minor differences among
sentences. For example, both two and three years of probation have
a point value of 2; a fine and one year of probation both have a value
of 1. Moreover, the scale provides no information on whether special
conditions, such as participation in a drug-abuse program, are attached to the sentence. On the whole, therefore, the scale will understate slightly the differences among sentences.
We propose to define and measure disparity as follows:
Sentence disparity is the expected percent difference between
two sentences if two judges, randomly selected from the court,
were to sentence the same case independently. Their two sentences are expressed as a percentage of their common mean.
Using the modified scale, we can derive the disparity figures from
the sentencing council data. The measure can, of course, be applied
to the disparity among more than two judges, by averaging the
disparities between all possible combinations of two judges. The
following example is for the case of three judges, and thereby describes the computation method for the New York council (Table
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Table 5
EXAMPLE FOR COMPUTING
SENTENCE DisPARrY AMONG THREE JUDGES

Example
Sentence

Judge
(1) Translate the sentences
recommended by each
judge into their respective
point values:

Points

A

3 yrs.

9 pts.

B

5 yrs.

11 pts.

C

7 yrs.

13 pts.

(33 - 3 = )

!lpts.

(2) Compute mean sentence

Judge Combinations
(3) Compute point differences
between each pair of judges:
(4) Compute mean difference
(5) Express mean difference
as percentage of mean
sentence

2 pts.
4 pts.
2pts.

A &B
A &C
B&C
(8

3 = )

(2.67 - 11 =)

2.67 pts.

24 percent

The sentence disparity in the example given in Table 5 is 24 percent.
Averaging the disparity measures in a great number of cases from a
court in which all judges participate in council panels yields a disparity measure for the court.
It would be possible to express disparity in terms of the absolute
point difference between two judges, by omitting operation (5). The
percent measure adopted here, on the other hand, considers the
sentence difference between one and three years to be more important than the difference between ten and twelve years,4 even though
the absolute disparity is two years in either case. The percent measure also corresponds to an important practical difference between
these two cases: for the parole board, which ultimately determines
how much time the offender will actually serve, the difference between one and three years is undoubtedly more critical than that
between ten and twelve years.
The disparity measures for the two courts, as derived from the
council data, are presented in Table 6 (page 123). Two judges will
thus differ, on the average, by between one-third and one-half of the
mean sentence.
40

The scale of the Administrative Office already makes this adjustment to a limited

extent; in the lower prison sentence ranges one point represents four months, in the higher
ranges, six months.
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Table 6
AVERAGE SENTENCE DISPARITIES OF TiE

Two

COURTS

Chicago*
36.7 percent (Std. Dev. 33.0%)
New York
45.5 percent (Std. Dev. 22.9%)
*for the one-third of the cases brought before the council

B.

Differences in Severity Among Judges

One cannot necessarily infer from the existence of sentence
disparity that some judges are generally more severe than others.
Even if sentence disparity were present, it might be true that all
judges sentenced, on the average, with equal severity. Each judge
might simply fluctuate around the same average. This situation
does not exist, however, in either of the two courts studied; in both,
some judges are clearly more severe than others.
The differences in severity among judges can be shown by measuring the deviation of each judge's sentencing recommendation
from the mean of all sentences proposed in any one case, taking into
account whether the deviation was toward the severe (+) or the
lenient (-) side. Since each judge takes part in numerous council
deliberations in all possible combinations with his colleagues, a reliable average deviation for each judge, in all cases in which he participates, may be computed:
Table 7
SEVERITY OF JUDGES*

Chicago

New York

Judge

Percent
Deviation

Number of
Cases

Judge

Percent
Deviation

Number of
Cases

A
B
C
D
E
F
G

-11
+10
+ 7
+ 4
- 1
-10
+ 5

(329)
(311)
(293)
(312)
(385)
(331)
(161)

A
B
C
D
E
F
G

- 5
-12
-11
+ 7
-11
+21
+24

(172)
(201)
(104)
(164)
(110)
(128)
(59)

H

+ 3

(48)

H

-10

(28)

I
J
K

-21
+58
+20

(61)
(27)
(77)

L

-2

(5)

*percent average deviation from the mean recommendation of all judges

If a judge always stood at his "average severity" position
(which, of course, he does not), Chicago Judge B would always be
10 percent more severe than the average, and Judge F would always
be 10 percent less severe than the average. Their sentences would
vary between 110 percent for Judge B (100 + 10) and 90 percent for

124

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:109

Judge F (100-10), a difference of about 20 percent. But none of
the judges on either court sentence with consistent severity, as, for
example, the New York voting pattern illustrates. Hence, in any
given case the difference between any two judges will, as a rule, be
larger or smaller than their average severity figures would indicate
(Table 8).
Table 8
VOTING POSITION OF NEW YORK JUDGES*

Judge
A

B

C

D

E

F

K

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

least severe

22

26

22

14

28

10

17

shares least severe position with
at least one other judge

24

21

24

15

19

8

8

all judges agree or the sentencing
judge is in the middle

24

28

33

26

33

24

21

shares most severe position with
at least one other judge
most severe

13
17

14
11

7
14

17
28

12
8

18
40

8
46

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

*with 75 or more cases

Therefore, it is not simply the fluctuation of sentences that
causes disparity; some judges are in fact more severe than others.4
Such differences in sentencing philosophies appear to be a major
cause of the sentence disparity that sentencing councils are designed to reduce.
V.

COUNCIL EFFORTS TO REDUCE DISPARITY

The primary purpose of the sentencing council is to reduce
sentence disparity by confronting the sentencing judge with the
views of his colleagues. If disparity is revealed, it is assumed that
the sentencing judge will change his sentence to reduce the disparity. To test this assumption, it is necessary to consider, first, how
often and under what circumstances the sentencing judge alters his
1,Actually, the situation is somewhat more complex. Judges will vary in their relative
severity level according to the particular type of case. These patterns will be examined in a
separate article along with the case characteristics that appear to promote disparity and
disparity reduction.
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original sentence decision and, second, the extent to which such
changes reduce disparity.
As Table 9 shows, sentencing judges in both courts change their
sentences in only about one-third of the cases they bring before their
councils. Roughly half of these changes involve shifts in sentence
type; the other half alter sentence length.
Table 9
CHANGES BY THE SENTENCING JUDGE
BETWEEN RECOMMENDATION AND DISPOSITION

Chicago
Increases Sentence
in type
in duration
Reduces Sentence
in type
in duration
Total Changes
No Change

13

New York
7

(4)
(9)

(3)
(4)

20

35
(11)
(9)
33
67

100%
(N = 434)*
*Cases with at least 3 judges in which the sentencing judge

(20)
(15)
42
58
100%
(N = 460)*

recorded an initial recommendation

Table 9 also shows that in both courts sentence reductions outnumber sentence increases. New York shows a higher frequency of
change (42 percent) than Chicago (33 percent). One might have
expected the participating judges in Chicago to be more amenable
to change, since participation in this council is voluntary. On the
other hand, Chicago judges might change less than the New York
judges because initial disparity was lower in Chicago. Another interesting difference is that the imbalance between increases and reductions is more pronounced in New York (7 to 35) than in Chicago (13
to 20). It will be shown, however, that the major part of this greater
imbalance in New York is unrelated to the council.2
Under what circumstances, then, will the judge change his original position? It is reasonable to assume that the extent of his disagreement with his fellow judges will be a critical factor in determining whether the sentencing judge changes his sentence. Table 10
42

See text at note 44 infra.
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supports this assumption. The six columns for each court represent
the six possible positions in which the sentencing judge may find
himself in relation to his colleagues.4 3
In the Chicago court (Table 10), if all the counseling judges
favor a more severe sentence (col. 1), the sentencing judge will increase his sentence in 46 percent of the cases. If some judges recommend a higher sentence, but at least one shares the sentencing
judge's recommendation (col. 2), the judge will increase his sentence
in only 17 percent of the cases. On the other hand, if all judges
vote for a more lenient sentence (col. 6), the sentencing judge will
reduce the severity of his sentence in 74 percent of the cases; he
will reduce the sentence 36 percent of the time even if only some of
his colleagues vote for a more lenient sentence as long as none votes
for a higher one. Finally, the sentencing judge may move in either
direction if the counseling judges split and recommend sentences
both higher and lower than his original recommendation. The
pattern of the New York court is similar, even though that court
has a more dramatic imbalance between sentence reductions and
sentence increases.
Table 10 shows the frequency and direction of changes by the
sentencing judge after the case has been before the council. Two
types of changes cannot plausibly be attributed to the council. The
first type (marked with an asterisk) are changes where the sentencing judge moves in the opposite direction from that recommended
by the counseling judges. If none of the counseling judges favor a
more lenient sentence (cols. 1, 2, 3) but the sentencing judge reduces the sentence anyway, or if none recommend a more severe
sentence (cols. 3, 5, 6) but the sentencing judge nevertheless increases the sentence, the council cannot have caused the change.
Second, there are cases in which the sentencing judge, although
changing in the direction recommended by his colleagues, moves
beyond the position held by the most extreme counseling judge. In
one case, for instance, the sentencing judge proposed a three-year
prison term, his colleagues recommended two years and one year
respectively, and the judge ultimately imposed a six-month sentence. Table 11 treats both of these kinds of changes as if the sentenc-

11By subdividing

the sample into groups based on the initial location of the sentencing

judge, the possibility of regression-that is, of the greater likelihood of extreme values to move
toward the mean upon a second measurement-arises. The role of regression in this study is
difficult to determine, however, since the very purpose of the council is to pull extreme values
back toward the mean. The second measure is thus not only independent of the first, but the
council is most likely to reduce disparity precisely where the regression phenomenon is most
likely to occur.
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ing judge made no change in his sentence and thereby represents as
changes only those shifts that could have been induced by the
council." The figures it presents, moreover, represent the estimates
of the maximum frequency of council-related changes.
In both cities, the maximum frequency of council-related
change is 27 percent. In 73 percent of the cases, the council did not
cause the judge to change. Sentence reductions in Chicago (16 percent) and increases (11 percent) are fairly balanced; in New York,
reductions occur three times as often as increases.
We have thus far assumed that nearly all decreases in columns
4, 5 and 6 are due to the council's influence. But since unexplained
reductions occurred in columns 1, 2 and 3, it is likely that at least
some of the reductions in columns 4, 5 and 6 are also noncouncilrelated. We estimate the frequency of these unrelated changes by
computing the mean percent of unexplained reductions from columns 1, 2 and 3 and applying the resulting figures (5 percent in
Chicago and 21 percent in New York) to the remaining columns.
The procedure is reversed to obtain the unrelated increases, which
only occur in Chicago:
Table 12
"UNEXPLAINED"

Reductions*
Increases**

SENTENCE CHANGES

Chicago

New York

5%
4%

21%
0

*mean of reductions in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 10
**mean of increases in columns 3, 5, and 6 of Table 10

Removing these additional unrelated changes yields an estimate of
the minimum frequency of council-induced changes, represented in
Table 13.
Somewhere between the maximum figures in Table 11 and the
minimum figures in Table 13 lies the true frequency of councilinduced changes. In Chicago the sentencing judge changes as a result of the council in between 25 and 27 percent of the cases. In New
York the range is between 20 and 27 percent.
" Conceivably, there could be an indirect relation to the council; the sentencing judge
may at times place an artificially severe sentencing proposal before the council intending to
make a later reduction in order to deter protracted disagreement. There is some indirect
statistical evidence to that effect: "noncouncil-related" reductions are slightly more apt to
occur if the counseling judges are on the severe side.
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Given this estimate of the frequency of change: by how much
does the sentencing council reduce sentence disparity?
VI.

MEASURING DISPARITY REDUCTION

Sentence disparity has been operationally defined as the expected percent difference between two sentences if two judges, selected at random from the court, were to sentence the same case
independently. To measure the extent to which sentencing councils
reduce disparity under this definition would require data about how
the council changes the views of the counseling judges as well as that
of the sentencing judge. In the absence of reliable data on this
point45 we propose to measure disparity reduction indirectly.
Considering the following model of a sentencing council procedure:
Every sentencing case is brought before the council, which consists of all judges of the court. After the sentencing judge has
effectively shared all of the relevant information on the case
with his brethren, each judge independently recommends the
sentence he considers appropriate. Under these conditions of
complete and equal information and responsibility, the court
accords equal weight to each recommendation. The judges
have agreed that the mean of the recommended sentences will
become the sentence of the court.
Such a system would not necessarily remove disparity between individual judges. But in the important sense of whether two offenders
under identical circumstances would receive the same sentence, this
procedure would remove disparity. To the offender it does not matter whether his sentence came about because every judge thought
it to be the best sentence or whether they simply agreed on the
procedure of averaging their sentences. This procedure would effectively remove disparity between any two judges, since each judge,
irrespective of his own position, would have to impose the same
sentence-the mean of all recommended sentences.
While the adoption of such a council rule would not be without
" In Chicago, the counseling judges are asked to write down their final recommendations
at the end of the meeting. Those judges change their recommended sentences about half as
frequently as the sentencing judge does. We were privately informed, however, that the
second notations by the counseling judges are not always accurate gauges of their true opinions. Perhaps they hope to minimize intra-court disharmony by reducing the apparent disparity.
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merit, it is introduced here only to make clear that as the sentencing
judge moves toward the mean sentence of all the judges, he reduces
the disparity. We propose to measure disparity reduction indirectly,
since the two distances-the disparity between any two judges and
the deviation of the sentencing judge from the mean-are related.
Using the deviation measure, then, will make it possible to measure
disparity reduction without knowing the extent to which counseling
judges' opinions are changed by the council." Thus, on the average,
if the sentencing judge removes a fraction of his distance from the
mean, we shall conclude that he thereby removes that fraction of
the disparity between any two judges.
Table 14 shows the schematic relationship between the two
measures.
Table 14
"BASIC DISPARITY"

SCHEMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

AND "VISIBLE DEVIATION"

Basic Disparity

1+4+5

=3.3)

F-

I

0

I4I
I

I

1

2

3

1

(3-1=2)

0

I
0

Visible Deviation

counseling
judge B
(6 years)

counseling
judge A
(2 years)

sentencing
judge
(1 year)

5

I

I

4

5

I

6 (scale)
0

0

-

I

2-

X

I

Mean Sentence
1+2+6

(

3

3)

position of sentencing judge
position of counseling judges
X mean sentence recommendation

*

O

46 The mean deviation multipled by 12 (n-l)

.of a sample from any distribution is

greater than the standard deviation of that sample. 1 M. KENDALL & A. STUART, THE ADVANCED THEORY OF STATISTICS 45 (2d ed. 1963). Furthermore, for any distribution, the
average standard deviation is greater than the average mean difference divided by the
square root of two. Therefore, the ratio of the average mean deviation to the average mean

n-1
If the sentences are normally disn
& A. STUART, supra at 240 n.1.

difference for any distribution is greater than-.

the rti\
ratio
tributed
trbuedth

2n/]

1 M.

KENDALL
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The New York court, unlike its counterpart in Chicago, does
not sit en banc but rather in three-judge panels. The mean sentences of these panels will deviate somewhat from the mean sentence
the entire court would have imposed. That difference is a disparity
invisible to the sentencing judge because he can only know the
panel's mean. Even if he accedes to that mean, the New York judge
will not have removed all disparity relative to the court's mean.
Statistical theory allows us to compute the size of that invisible
difference (2b in Table 15),11 and, by adding it to the visible one, it
is possible to estimate the deviation of the New York sentencing
judge from the mean sentence of the entire court. Table 15 compares
the deviations from the mean in the two courts.
The basic disparity is higher in New York (45.5 percent) than
in Chicago (36.7 percent). The lower figure for the Chicago council
probably stems from its voluntary character; the judges who choose
to participate in the council are relatively likeminded. The visible
deviation of the sentencing judge from the mean of the council is
the same in both courts (23.3 and 23.5 percent), but once the "invisible" deviation is added to the visible deviation from the mean in
the New York council, the latter shows a greater total deviation.
The judges in the two courts studied, unlike those in the hypothetical sentencing council, seldom impose a sentence that is the
mean of all council judges' recommendations. At times they remove
only part of their deviation from the mean, and at times they even
increase the deviation by moving away from the mean. The following diagrams illustrate the four types of moves open to the sentencing judge:
'1 There are 56 possible ways of selecting 3 judges from a court of 8 judges. The mean
deviation for each of the 56 three-judge panels could be calculated theoretically, but in reality
the only calculation that can be made is for the combination that actually occurs in a
particular case. The average of the 56 mean deviations is different from the mean deviation
of all 8 of the judges in the council. How is the mean deviation of a three-judge subgroup
related to the mean deviation of all 8 judges? Averaged over sentences that are normally
distributed, the average of the 56 mean deviations is smaller than the mean deviation of all
8 judges and accordingly an upward adjustment of 15 percent must be made in the mean
deviation for the three-judge panels. For a panel of n judges and subgroups of size k, the
upward adjustment is:

/

1/2
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Table 15
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BASIC DISPARITY AND DEVIATION OF THE SENTENCING
JUDGE FROM THE MEAN IN THE Two COURTS

Chicago

New York

36.7%

45.5%

Distance of sentencing judge from the mean
of all participating council judges .......................... 23.5%

23.3%

Basic Disparity (1)
Average difference between the sentence imposed in the same
case by any two judgeg randomly selected from the court .....
Visible Part of the Deviation (2a)

Invisible Part of the Deviation (2b)
If the council does not
consist of the entire court
but only of smaller subgroups, the difference
between the means of those
subgroups and the (potential)
mean of the entire court in
each case is invisible.
For 3-judge panels that
difference is on the average
15% of the visible deviation .................................. .- *

3.5%

Total Deviation (2a + 2b)
Total distance of sentencing
judge from the mean of all
judges of the court ........................................

*In the Chicago council all participating judges sit en banc.

23.5%

26.8%

1975]

Sentencing Councils and Disparity

(a) The judge moves toward the mean and stops either at or
before it, thereby reducing deviation from the mean.
(1)

SJ

Mean

o

x

0o------------------------------(b) The judge moves beyond the mean but stops at a point
closer to the mean than was his original recommendation, thereby
achieving a net reduction of deviation.
(2)

SJ

Mean

o

x

0 ------------------------------------------

(c) The judge moves beyond the mean and stops at a point at
least as far from the mean as was his original recommendation. He
thus increases deviation or leaves it unchanged.
(3)

Mean

SJ

o

x

0o--------------------------------------------------(d) When the sentencing judge occupies the middle position,
he is often so close to the mean that in changing his sentence he
moves away from it, thereby increasing disparity.
(4)

SJ

Mean

O

X

<.......-------0

Table 16 shows the frequency of the four types of moves by the
sentencing judges on each court.
The majority of these moves reduce sentence disparity, yielding
a net reduction of deviation (Table 17). The sentence changes shown
in Table 17 are those developed in Table 11 and hence represent the
maximum estimate of changes attributable to the council.
For the 73 percent of the cases in which the sentencing judge
does not change his original recommendation, the average deviation
in each court is 20 percent. In the 27 percent of the cases in which
the judge does change, his original deviation averages 33 percent in
Chicago and 36 percent in New York, from which the changes remove 9 percentage points (of 33 and 36 percent, respectively), or
about one-quarter of the deviation (27 and 25 percent, respectively).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:109

Table 16
FREQUENCY OF THE

FOUR TYPES

OF

MovES

BY

THE SENTENCING JUDGE IN THE COUNCIL

Chicago

New York

Reduces deviationby moving
(1) toward the mean
(2) beyond the mean,
still reducing deviation

33

32

Increases deviation by moving
(3) so far beyond the mean,
that deviation is increased
or unchanged
(4) away from the mean

31
12

16
27
43

44

100%

100%

Table 17
REDUCTION OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE'S VISIBLE DEVIATION *
(IN PERCENT OF THE MEAN SENTENCE)

Chicago**

(1)
Share of Cases
%

Average
Size of
Deviation

(73)
(27)

20
33

Sentencing Judge
Does not change
Changes

Total

(100%)

(2)
Reduction
in
Council
0

(2) as Percent
of (1)

9

0%
27%

23.5

2.5

10.6%

20
36

0
9

0%
25%

23.3

2.5

New York
Sentencing Judge
Does not change
Changes

Total

(73)
(27)
(100%)

*From the mean
**Only for the one-third of the cases coming before the Chicago council

10.7%

Sentencing Councils and Disparity
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The initial average visible deviation in each city was about 23 percent. In each city, these figures were reduced as a result of the
sentencing council by 2.5 points, or a little over 10 percent. The
drops from 27 and 25 percent to roughly 10 percent in the last
column reflect the fact that the council fails to move the judge in
73 percent of the cases.
We now apply the share of the deviations removed by the council to the basic disparity 8 and thereby arrive at the final evaluation
of the council's effectiveness in reducing disparity (Table 18).
Table 18
EFFECT OF THE COUNCIL ON SENTENCE DISPARITY
(AVERAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SENTENCES
IMPOSED IN THE SAME CASE BY ANY TWO JUDGES,
RANDOMLY SELECTED FROM THE COURT)

Chicago

New York

36.7

45.5

Disparity prior to
council deliberation

Percent removed by council

-10.6

Disparity remaining
after council

-9.6*

32.8

41.1

*adjusted by reducing the 10.7 share (Table 17) by 10 percent for "invisible deviation"
in New York (Table 15)

In each court the council removed about 10 percent of the existing disparity, thus reducing disparity in New York from 45 to 41
percent, in Chicago from 37 to 33 percent.
VII.

COMPARING THE

Two

COURTS

The amount of disparity reduction is strikingly similar in the
two courts. But this similarity should not mask the different processes that produced the result. In order to assess the relative impact of the two sentencing councils, their structure and operation
must be compared in terms of case composition, council size, and
whether participation was voluntary.
A.

Differences in Case Composition

The urban character and the population of the New York and
Chicago districts are roughly comparable but the composition of the
cases that come before the two courts differ in a number of ways,
as Table 19 shows.

11The ratio of these deviations to the disparity in those courts, .59 in New York and .64
in Chicago, corresponds well with the theoretical value. Cf. note 47 supra.
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Table 19
DISTRIRUTION OF OFFENSES

Chicago

New York

Narcotics
Marijuana and
Other Drugs

7.8

29.2

4.3

9.0

Bank Robbery

3.0

8.3

Theft and Interstate
Transport of Stolen Goods

28.1

12.9

Other Property Crimes

19.5

11.2

All Other Crimes

37.3

29.4

100.0%

100.0%

Over 38 percent of all New York cases were drug-related, compared to 12 percent in Chicago. Chicago also had fewer bank robberies than New York, perhaps because Illinois does not permit branch
banking and hence reduces the opportunities for committing that
crime. The Chicago court, on the other hand, had a higher frequency
of theft, fraud, and interstate transport of stolen property, probably
because Chicago is centrally located and has numerous road and
railway transport systems passing through it.
The crime mix for which the New York offenders were convicted
was somewhat more serious. Taking the maximum sentence the law
allows for a given offense as a measure of seriousness, the average
of these maximum years was 11.2 years for New York and 10.0 years
for Chicago.49 This difference in seriousness of the crimes may account for some of the differences observed between the two courts.
B.

Council Size

The New York council meets in three-judge panels on a rotation
basis, whereas the Chicago council meets en banc. Because the Chicago council is much larger than the New York panel, two countervailing factors may influence the sentencing judge. First, the sentencing judge may be more likely to heed the council's advice if he
is opposed by a larger number of his colleagues. In New York, a
" The recommendations and sentences of the sentencing judges reflect this difference.
The average recommendation was 8.5 in New York and 5.1 in Chicago; the average sentence
in New York was 7.4 and in Chicago it was 4.9. The size of the difference suggests that factors
other than the severity of the case may contribute to the different severity levels in the two
courts. New York also has a higher share of convictions after jury trial (16%) than Chicago
(10%). Bench trial convictions are more frequent in Chicago (5%) than in New York (2%).
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maximum of two judges can oppose the sentencing judge; in Chicago, many more may oppose him (Table 20).
Table 20
LIKELIHOOD OF SHIFT DEPENDING
ON THE VOTING POSITION OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE

Position of Sentencing Judge

Chicago

New York

All judges more severe

42%

28%

Some judges more severe,
none less severe

13%

7%

Judges on both sides

24%

17%

Some judges less severe,
none more severe

31%

25%

All judges less severe

69%

51%

In each voting position, the Chicago judge is more likely to change
than his New York counterpart. On the other hand, as the size of
the council becomes larger, the sentencing judge will find himself
less frequently in an extreme position, as shown in Table 21:
Table 21
DISAGREEMENT CONSTELLATION VIS-A-VIS THE SENTENCING JUDGE

all more severe
some more severe
all agree

Chicago

New York

5

16

34

20

8

13

disagree in both directions

30

20

some less severe

14

14

all less severe

9

17

100%

100%

The Chicago judge is less frequently in an extreme position, but
when he finds himself there he may feel more pressure to alter his
original recommendation. It may well be that the countervailing
effects produced by the larger council size of the Chicago court
simply cancel each other.
C.

Voluntary Participation

Participation in the Chicago council is voluntary, and some
judges do not take part. Even those who do participate do not bring
all their cases before the council. Table 22 gives an overview of this
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limited participation, and Table 23 breaks down the total number
of cases sentenced by the six judges who do not participate in the
council and by the eight who do.
Table 22
PERCENT OF CASES BROUGHT BEFORE THE CHICAGO COUNCIL

BY EACH OF THE

76

14

JUDGES OF THE COURT

76
72

64

62

A

B

C

DE
Participating
judges

16
6-

F

G

H

0_

0

0

I

J

K

010 I

LMN
1*

Nonparticipating
judges

The width of the bar indicates the judge's share of cases in the sample.
*senior judges with reduced caseloads

There are thus three groups of cases that reach the sentencing
stage, each accounting for about one-third of the total.
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Table 23
SHARE OF THE CHICAGO CASES BROUGHT BEFORE THE COUNCIL

Percent
68

Cases not brought before council
cases of participating judges
cases of nonparticipating judges

(33)
(35)
32

Cases brought before council

100%
number of cases (1619)

The voluntary and limited participation in the Chicago council
raises certain questions. First, what distinguishes the nonparticipating from the participating judges? Second, what distinguishes the
cases withheld by the participating judges from those brought before the council? Finally, how much further would disparity in Chicago be reduced if council participation were obligatory? Table 24
helps answer the first question: one characteristic that distinguishes
nonparticipating judges from the participating judges is their age.
Table 24
AGE AND YEARS ON THE BENCH
OF PARTICIPATING AND NONPARTICIPATING JUDGES

Nonparticipating Judges

Participating Judges
Age

Years on
Bench

Age

Years on
Bench
5
8

46
49

*
*

66
66

51
54

1
*

68
69**

9
31

55
58
60
63

1
10
10
6

71
75**
76**

10
20
19

70

15 yrs.

Average
Average 54

3 yrs.

*Less than 1 year
**Senior judges

There is a clear division: all judges under 65 participate; judges
over that age do not. Years on the bench is related to age, but this
factor does not clearly divide the two groups of judges. Although all
five of the new members of the court participate, they are joined by
three of the more experienced judges, two of whom have been on the
bench for ten years. The council thus allows the newer judges to
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become familiar with the court's sentencing practices 0
There are two criteria that distinguish the cases the participating judges withhold from the council from those they bring before
it: the seriousness of the offense and whether the conviction was
handed down by a jury. Judges are most likely to bring before the
council the more serious criminal cases and those cases in which
conviction was obtained by jury trial (Table 25).
Table 25
PROPORTION OF CASES BROUGHT TO THE COUNCIL
BY SEVERITY OF THE CRIME* AND TYPE OF CONVICTION
(PERCENTAGE ARE BASED ON THE NUMBER OF CASES IN EACH CELL)

No
Custody

Custody

Guilty Plea

35%
(573)

60%
(318)

Bench Trial

42%
(19)

61%
(37)

Jury Trial

83%
(18)

73%
(84)

*as measured by the sentence actually imposed for noncouncil
cases and by the sentencing judge's initial sentence recommendation in council cases.

Sixty percent of all guilty plea cases likely to result in prison
sentences were brought to the council; only 35 percent of the noncustody guilty plea cases were brought to the council. 51 Possibly the
judge considers the duration of a prison sentence to be a more important issue than the length of probation and therefore is more
interested in his colleagues' advice. 2 Another reason may be that
there is greater variation in the length of custody sentences. These
percentages hardly change if the conviction was obtained after a
bench trial. But if there was a jury trial, the proportion of cases
brought to the council was high, regardless of whether the case was
likely to end in a custody sentence.
Finally, the voluntary character of the Chicago council weakens
its power to reduce overall sentence disparity in the court, because
" Two of the three more experienced participating judges bring few of their cases before
the council, thus reinforcing the notion that the council serves an educative function.
1, The classification custody-noncustody is based upon the initial recommendation of the
sentencing judge.
52 We have not determined for this article the types of cases-distinguished by crime,
defendant, and mode of conviction-in which the sentencing judge is more (or less) likely to
accept the advice of the council.
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only one-third of all cases come before the council. To estimate the
council's effect on the entire court, it is necessary to estimate the
disparity in the two-thirds of all cases not brought before the council.
The participating judges fail to bring one-half of their cases
before the council; this represents one-third of the total cases. There
is evidence that these cases tend to be low-sentence, noncustody
cases,53 which have a somewhat lower average disparity." On the
other hand, the one-third of all cases heard by nonparticipating
judges will tend to involve above-average disparity: four of the six
nonparticipating judges are found at the extremes of the severity
spectrum; one near the lower extreme, two near the upper extreme,
and one judge so severe that he exceeded the upper extreme.5
If we assume that these two deviations offset each other, we
may conclude that the two-thirds of all cases that do not come
before the council have the same average disparity as the one-third
that come before it. A 10.7 percent reduction in disparity was found
for the one-third of the Chicago cases brought before the council.
Assuming that the remaining two-thirds have the same average
disparity, this 10.7 percent decrease in disparity must be reduced
by two-thirds to reflect the council's effect on all cases sentenced in
the Chicago court. Therefore, the council reduces the sentence disparity of all cases in the Chicago court by not quite 4 percent.
VIII.

THE NONCOUNCIL-RELATED CHANGES

At an earlier stage of our analysis we decided temporarily to
disregard changes by the sentencing judge that could not be meaningfully related to the council's deliberations. We tentatively
assumed these changes were induced by events that occurred after
the council finished its deliberation. By definition, all of these
changes were away from the mean, and hence would have increased
See Table 25 supra.
5 The New York court shows the same pattern:
Chicago
Mean Severity
.01 - 3.49
3.5 - 6.99
7.0 or higher

Percent Disparity
29.8
46.7
36.4

"
This ranking was derived from the net percentage of cases in which a judge imposed
custody if the Probation Department recommended probation, minus the cases where the
judge gave probation where the Probation Department recommended custody. This was the
only severity measure for which we had data on all judges, including those who did not
participate in the council.
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disparity. They, too, constitute a major difference between the two
courts: in Chicago, their number was negligible, between 6 and 8
percent of all cases, depending on the mode of computation; in New
York, their number was between 15 and 22 percent." The judges in
New York explained that these changes, all sentence reductions,
were made on the basis of the information conveyed in the sentencing hearing. There the prosecutor, as a rule, stands silent and only
the defense speaks. Although all of these moves were in the direction
away from the counseling judges' recommendations, we decided not
to consider them as increasing disparity, under the optimistic assumption that the counseling judges would have changed with the
sentencing judge had they become aware of the new information.
But, since only New York shows this high frequency of unexplained
reductions, the puzzle remains. We hope to resolve it eventually by
tracing these changes and having them explained as they occur.

IX.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

We have analyzed many facets of the sentencing councils, and
we shall now summarize our findings and discuss their limitations.
We shall also propose possible alternatives a court might adopt to
help reduce sentence disparity.
Here, first, is the summary of our findings-the amount of sentence disparity that exists among the judges of the two courts, the
amount removed by the sentencing council, and the amount of
disparity that remains (Table 26).11
In each court the council is able to reduce about 10 percent of
the sentence disparity in the cases that come before it. In Chicago,
since only one-third of the cases are brought before the council, the
reduction in all cases is under 4 percent.
To evaluate this statistic, one must see its limitations. First,
the roughness of the measuring scale fails to detect such minor but
potentially important nuances as special treatments or conditions
accompanying a sentence.

"'

See text at note 44.
"7See Table 18 supra.

" In our one observation of a council meeting in Chicago, we could see several instances
of this role of the council. In one case, discussion turned on whether the offender should be
sentenced under the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act which allows the conviction

record to be expunged. In another case, the judges discussed the feasibility of a work-release

form of incarceration which would allow the offender to keep his job. A third discussion
hinged on the probation officer's recommendation that the offender be required to move his
residence in order to avoid the temptation of further gang activities.
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Table 26
EFFECT OF COUNCIL ON DISPARITY
(LIKELY DIFFERENCE IN THE SENTENCES
OF Two JUDGES SELECTED RANDOMLY FROM THE COUir)*

(a)
(b)
(b x a)
(a-b x a)

Chicago

New York

Cases before
the Council

All
Cases

All
Cases

Disparity Prior to
Council Deliberation*

36.7

36.7

45.5

Percent of Disparity
Removed by the Council*

10.6

3.6**

9.6

Percentage points removed
by Council

3.9

1.3"*

4.4

Disparity after Council
Reduction*

32.8

35.4

41.1

*From Table 18
**Because of voluntary participation, only 1/3 of all cases

More importantly, the study observes reduction only within the
narrow time interval between discussion in the council and the imposition of sentence. It thus does not indicate anything about the
possible long-range effect of the council. It may be that the very
existence of the council tends to reduce disparity and that the disparity observed among initial recommendations would be greater
were it not for the experience gained by the judges in previous meetings.
In order to determine whether the council has this long-range
effect, it would be necessary to measure its disparity at different
points in time and to compare these data with parallel measurements in a court with no council. We retrieved rudimentary data on
such a comparison from the study of the Second Circuit by the
Federal Judicial Center. 5 That study asked each district judge in
the Second Circuit for his sentence recommendations on an array
of twenty selected cases. By comparing the judges of the Eastern
District (who participate in a sentencing council) with those of the
Southern District (who do not), we were able to compute the sentence disparities for the two districts (Table 27).
The disparity in the Eastern District is not smaller, and is even
somewhat larger, than in the Southern District. Table 27 provides
an important by-product. The disparity figure computed for the
1,See note 26 supra (our computation).
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Table 27
SENTENCE DISPARITY IN A COURT WITH A
SENTENCING COUNCIL AND IN A COURT WITHOUT ONE

Eastern District
of New York
(Before Discussion by
Council)

Southern District
of New York

From the Federal Judicial
Center Study of Simulated Cases

47.8%

42.0%

From the Sentencing Council Data

45.5%

Eastern District from the Federal Judicial Center study is nearly
identical to the disparity measure derived from the sentencing council, suggesting that simulation results may parallel sentencing council results.
The data are only suggestive, since the comparison refers to
only one point in time and we do not know the disparity with which
each court began. But to sustain the notion of a long-range effect of
the council in reducing disparity, we would have to assume that the
original sentence disparity in the Eastern District was even larger
than the observed 47.8 percent. This is a difficult notion to sustain
since the two districts are adjacent and similar and their judges
come from the same reservoir.
There are inherent difficulties in measuring reduction in disparity over time. The sentencing practices of individual judges may
change, and the composition of the court will change as judges retire
and are replaced. To assess the full impact of the council on this
learning process, it would be necessary to trace the sentencing patterns of individual judges over time.
Again, a substitute measure was developed by grouping the
judges according to their years on the bench and then comparing
their average percent distance from the mean, as in Table 28.
TABLE 28
AVERAGE PERCENT DISTANCES FROM THE MEAN FOR
JUDGES* GROUPED By YEARS ON THE BENCH

Chicago
New York

1 year to
2 years

Over 2 years
to 5 years

Over 5 years

26%
29%

26%

26%
27%

*for all cases in which judge gave a recommended sentence
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Although this table does not indicate the disparity of the more
experienced judges when they first joined the bench, the near uniformity of disparity levels suggests that further research may not
disclose that disparity significantly declines over time in a court
with a sentencing council.
Finally, the present study was primarily actuarial, comparing
the sentences recommended before the council convened with the
sentences eventually imposed. We have observed no council meeting in New York and only one in Chicago. Council meetings may be
useful simply as a relief from the isolation in which the judge finds
himself. One participant in the sentencing council of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Michigan described the process with sensitivity:
It is here, in the give and take of fraternal discussion, that
points are emphasized or subordinated according to the judgment of the individual judges, with the result that there is a
close approach to a common meeting ground. The weights assigned to the various factors thought to be controlling as to
disposition of the case are sometimes modified by the sentencing judge in the light of the experience of his brother judges
with their own previous sentences. 0
These qualifications notwithstanding, a simple balance remains: against an effort of some two to three hours per week for each
judge, the sentencing council cures not more than 10 percent of the
disparity in the cases that come before it. In New York, disparity is
reduced from 45 to 41 percent. In Chicago, the original disparity of
some 37 percent is reduced by 4 percent in the cases that come
before the council, and thus only 1 percent across all cases.
There might be ways of improving the effectiveness of the council. One would be to require the sentencing judge to adopt the median" of the recommended sentences. While such a rule would effectively reduce disparity, it might reduce the autonomy of the judges
to an unacceptable degree.6" The ultimate goal of all arrangements
Quoted in Smith, supra note 31, at 9.
The median is the point at which half of the recommended sentences are more severe,
and half are less severe. Unlike the mean, it cannot be influenced by judges who try to
increase their weight by submitting a recommendation more extreme than the sentence they
would actually impose.
42 Sherwood Zimmerman, a student of Professor Leslie Wilkins at the State University
of New York at Albany, simulated group sentencing decisions under three different procedures: (1) the group has purely advisory capacity; (2) consensus should be reached after
deliberation; (3) the mean sentence of a secret ballot becomes the sentence of the court. He
'
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to reduce disparity must not be to average the various sentence
recommendations but to bring the initial recommendations closer
together.
A promising way to achieve that goal might be to expand upon
the information role performed by the council in acquainting the
sentencing judge with the sentences his colleagues would impose.
Courts could set up internal reporting systems of all sentences imposed by their judges or the judges of their circuit. Already used in
many courts, computers could provide the judges with the distribution of sentences, together with their means and medians for any
combination of crime and offender. Eventually, such data could
form the foundation for meaningful sentencing guidelines, especially if they included information about the parole board decisions
and hence the relationship between sentence and actual time
served." One might consider developing such an information system
either as a supplement to the council or as a substitute for it. This
approach should be particularly helpful in nonmetropolitan districts, where judges, because of the geographic isolation, are unable
to attend council meetings.
At this time, the most determined efforts to reduce disparity
through clear but flexible guidelines are made at the last stage of
the regular sentencing process by the United States Parole Board."
The sentencing council, even if its reduction effect is small, represents one of the very few institutional attempts to resolve the disparity problem. The participating judges, although aware of its modest
impact, like the council and find the time they devote to it well
spent.
found procedure (1), modeled after the sentencing council, least likely to reduce disparity

within and between groups and procedure (3) most likely to reduce it; procedure (2) leads to
intermediate results.

The multiplicity of sentencing choices available to the courts, and the varying attitudes between sentencing judges results in a wide disparity in the lengths of sentence
imposed on persons convicted of similar offences and often who possess similar backgrounds. To a very real degree, the Board of Parole tends, in practice, to equalize this
disparity whenever it is not bound to the one-third maximum line required in regular
sentences.
UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, BIENNIAL REPORT 1968-1970, at 13 (1970).
Through bold integration of research and policy making, Professor Wilkins, supranote
62, under another grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, has joined the
U.S. Parole Board in a broad reform move. The examiners and the board are now operating
under clear guidelines, which take into consideration the gravity of the commited crime and
the record of the offender. The prisoner's behavior in the institution allows the examiner to
deviate slightly from the guidelines. If he cares to exceed the limits, he needs approval of the
board. Unless, therefore, the sentencing judge prescribed a minimum sentence, the parole
board imposes in fact a de novo sentence. This is an interesting reflection on the sentencing
system and might well hasten its reform. Some of the underlying thinking is reported in W.
13

AMos & C. NEWMAN, PARoLE (1975).
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We cannot disagree. In the absence of legislative reform
efforts,"5 the sentencing council is a progressive innovation that deserves support, if only as the first step in the resolution of a troublesome problem. An average sentence disparity between any two
judges of around 40 percent is too much.
0 Some state courts have attempted to reduce sentence disparity through sentence review by a panel of three trial judges, which may not include the sentencing judge, after
sentence has been pronounced.

